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Abstract
In this paper we show that N -player stochastic games with singular controls, either of
bounded velocity or of finite variation, can both be approximated by mean field games (MFGs)
with singular controls of bounded velocity. This result follows from three key components: first,
the convergence of singular control problems of bounded velocity to singular control problems of
finite variation; second, the existence and uniqueness of the optimal control to MFGs of bounded
velocity; and third, the approximation of N -player stochastic games with singular controls of
bounded velocity by the MFG with singular controls of bounded velocity.
1 Introduction
N -player non-zero-sum stochastic games are notoriously hard to analyze. Recently, the theory of
Mean Field Games (MFGs), pioneered by Lasry and Lions (2007) and Huang, Malhame´, and Caines
(2006), presents a powerful approach to study stochastic games of a large population with small
interactions. (See for example, [6], [7], [9], [11], [12], [13], [15], [21], [22], [25], [27], [28], and [30].)
MFG avoids directly analyzing the difficult N -player stochastic games. Instead, it approximates
the dynamics and the objective function via the notion of population’s probability distribution
flows, a.k.a., mean information processes. Under proper technical conditions, the optimal control
to an MFG is shown to be an ǫ-Nash Equilibrium (ǫ-NE) to its corresponding N -player game. (See
[4], [10], [25]; also [3], [16] and [19].) As such, MFGs provide an elegant and analytically feasible
framework to approximate N -player stochastic games. This approximation of N -player stochastic
games by MFGs is, however, established within the framework of regular controls where controls
are absolutely continuous.
A natural question is, will this relation between the MFG and the N -player game hold under a
more general mathematical framework where controls are allowed to be discontinuous? This is the
focus of this paper: within a singular control framework, it analyzes the approximation of N -player
stochastic games with singular controls by their corresponding MFGs.
MFGs and stochastic games with singular controls. There are two types of singular con-
trols, namely, singular controls of finite variation and singular controls of bounded velocity. It is
well documented that analysis of singular controls is much harder compared to regular controls.
From a PDE perspective, the associated fully nonlinear PDE is coupled with possibly state- and
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time-dependent gradient constraints. From a control perspective, the Hamiltonian for singular con-
trols of finite variation diverges [31] and the standard stochastic maximal principle fails; even in
the case of bounded velocity, the Hamiltonian is discontinuous.
Most existing literature on MFGs are with regular controls where the controls are absolutely
continuous. The existence of solutions to MFGs relies on the assumption that the Hamiltonian
H(x, p) has sufficient regularity, especially with respect to p. For instance, [28] assumes that H
is of class C1 in p, and [8] assumes that H is of class C2 and that the second-order derivative
with respect to p is Lipschitz continuous. The exception is [27], which establishes in a general
framework the existence of Markovian equilibrium solutions when controls are continuous but may
not be Lipschitz. (See Remark 2 for more discussions.) Nevertheless, the question remains as to
whether N -player games can be approximated by MFGs with singular controls.
Our work. In this paper we show that N -player stochastic games with singular controls, both
of finite variation and of bounded velocity, can be approximated under the NE criterion by MFGs
with singular controls of bounded velocity. On one hand, this relation is natural as it is parallel
to the relation established in earlier works for regular controls. On the other hand, it suggests
that one can completely circumvent the more difficult MFGs of singular controls of finite variation,
when analyzing stochastic games of singular type. Instead one can focus on the singular controls
games of bounded velocity.
Indeed, singular controls of bounded velocity share some nice properties with regular controls
and are easier to analyze than singular controls of finite variation. This conviction underlines the
main idea in our analysis of the relation between MFGs and the associated N -player stochastic
games. The analysis consists of three components: first, we analyze the relationship between the
underlying singular control problems. We show that under proper assumptions, the value function
of singular controls of bounded velocity converges to that of singular controls of finite variation as
the bound goes to infinity (Theorem 1). We then establish the existence, the uniqueness, and the
regularity for the solution to the MFG with singular controls of bounded velocity (Theorem 2).
These two ingredients enable us to show that: (i) given a bounded velocity θ, the optimal control
to the MFG with singular controls of bounded velocity is an ǫN -NE to an N -player game with
singular controls of bounded velocity with ǫN = O(
1√
N
), and (ii) the optimal control to the MFG
is an (ǫN + ǫθ)-NE to an N -player game with singular controls of finite variation, where ǫθ is an
error term that depends on θ (Main Theorem).
Other related work. There are earlier works relating singular controls with bounded velocity
and with finite variation. For instance, exploiting this relation enables [29] to establish the existence
of the optimal singular control of finite variation for a controlled Brownian motion. This relation is
also analyzed in [24] for a monotone follower type of singular controls. None of these works is in a
game setting. Moreover, to establish the relation between MFGs and N -player games in a singular
control framework, we need an explicit construction for the optimal control policies.
Recently, [2] proposes a Markov chain based approximation approach for numerically solving
MFGs with reflecting barriers and shows its convergence. More recently, [17] shows under the
notion of weak (distributional) NE that N -player stochastic games with singular controls of finite
variation can be approximated by that of bounded velocity, if the set of NEs for the latter is
relatively compact under an appropriate topology. The focus of these works is different from ours.
2
2 Problem formulations and main results
We start with (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)0≤t≤∞, P ) a probability space in which W i = {W it }0≤t≤∞ are i.i.d.
standard Brownian motion with i = 1, . . . , N <∞. Let P(R) be the set of all probability measures
on R, and Pp(R) be the set of all probability measures of pth order on R. That is
Pp(R) =
{
µ ∈ P(R)
∣∣∣∣
(∫
R
|x|pµ(dx)
) 1
p
<∞
}
.
To define the flow of probability measures {µt}t≥0, let us recall the pth order Wasserstein metric
on Pp(R) defined as
Dp(µ, µ′) = inf
µ˜∈Γ(µ,µ′)
(∫
R×R
|y − y′|pµ˜(dy, dy′)
) 1
p
,
where Γ(µ, µ′) is the set of all coupling of µ and µ′. Denote C([0, T ],P2(R)) for all continuous
mappings from [0, T ] to P2(R). Then M[0,T ] ⊂ C([0, T ],P2(R)) is a class of flows of probability
measures such that there exists a positive constant c so that
M[0,T ] =
{
{µt}0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣ sup
s 6=t
D1(µt, µs)
|t− s| 12
≤ c, sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫
R
|x|2µt(dx) ≤ c
}
.
M[0,T ] is a metric space endowed with the metric
dM
(
{µt}0≤t≤T , {µ′t}0≤t≤T
)
= sup
0≤t≤T
D2(µt, µ
′
t). (1)
Throughout, we will use Lip(ψ) as a Lipschitz coefficient of ψ for any given Lipschitz function
ψ. That is, |ψ(x) − ψ(y)| ≤ Lip(ψ)|x − y| for any x, y ∈ R, we will use
Lψ(x) = b(x)∂xψ(x) + 1
2
σ2(x)∂xxψ(x),
for the infinitesimal generator for any stochastic process
dxt = b(xt)dt+ σ(xt)dWt,
and any ψ(x) ∈ C2. And we say that a function f is of a polynomial growth if |f(x)| ≤ c(|x|k + 1)
for some constants c and k, for all x.
2.1 Problems of N-player stochastic games
N-player game with singular controls of finite variation. Fix a time T < ∞ and suppose
that there are N identical players in the game. Denote {xit}s≤t≤T as the state process in R for
player i (i = 1, . . . , N), with xis− = xi starting from time s ∈ [0, T ]. Now assume that the dynamics
of {xit} follows, for s ≤ t ≤ T ,
dxit =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
t, x
j
t )dt+ σdW
i
t + dξ
i+
t − dξi−t , xis− = xi, (2)
3
where b0 : R × R → R is bounded, Lipschitz continuous, and σ is a positive constant. Here
ξi· = (ξi+· , ξi−· ) is the control by player i with (ξi+· , ξi−· ) nondecreasing, ca`dla`g, ξ
i+
s− = ξ
i−
s− = 0,
E
[∫ T
s
dξi+t
]
<∞, and E
[∫ T
s
dξi−t
]
<∞.
Given Eqn. (2), the objective of player i is to minimize, over an appropriate control set UN ,
her cost function J i,N (s, xi, ξi+· , ξi−· ; ξ−i· ). That is
inf
(ξi+· ,ξ
i−
· )∈UN
J i,N (s, xi, ξi+· , ξ
i−
· ; ξ
−i
· ) = inf
(ξi+· ,ξ
i−
· )∈UN
E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x
i
t, x
j
t )dt+ γ1dξ
i+
t + γ2dξ
i−
t

 .
(N-FV)
Here ξ−i· = {(ξj+· , ξj−· )}Nj=1,j 6=i denotes the set of controls for all the players except for player i,
the cost function f0 : R×R→ R is Lipschitz continuous, γ1 and γ2 are constants, and
UN =
{
(ξ+· , ξ
−
· )
∣∣∣∣ ξ+t and ξ−t are F (x1t ,...,xNt )t -adapted, ca´dla´g, nondecreasing,
ξ+s− = ξ
−
s− = 0,E
[∫ T
s
dξ+t
]
<∞, and E
[∫ T
s
dξ−t
]
<∞, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T
}
,
with {F (x1t ,...,xNt )t }s≤t≤T the natural filtration of {x1t , . . . , xNt }s≤t≤T .
N-player game with singular controls of bounded velocity. If one restricts the controls
(ξi+· , ξi−· ) to be with a bounded velocity such that for a given constant θ > 0,
dξi+t = ξ˙
i+
t dt, dξ
i−
t = ξ˙
i−
t dt,
with 0 ≤ ξ˙i+t , ξ˙i−t ≤ θ. Then game (N-FV) becomes
inf
(ξi+· ,ξ
i−
· )∈UNθ
J
i,N
θ (s, x
i, ξi+· , ξ
i−
· ; ξ
−i
· ) = inf
(ξi+· ,ξ
i−
· )∈UNθ
E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x
i
t, x
j
t )dt+ γ1ξ˙
i+
t dt+ γ2ξ˙
i−
t dt

 ,
(N-BD)
subject to dxit =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
t, x
j
t )dt+ σdW
i
t + ξ˙
i+
t dt− ξ˙i−t dt, xis = xi. (3)
Here the admissible set is given by
UNθ =
{
(ξ+· , ξ
−
· )
∣∣∣∣ (ξ+· , ξ−· ) ∈ UN , 0 ≤ ξ˙+t , ξ˙−t ≤ θ, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T
}
.
There are several criteria to analyze stochastic games. Two standard ones are the Pareto
Optimality and the NE. In this paper we will focus on NE. Depending on the problem setting
and in particular the admissible controls, there are several forms of NEs, including the open loop
NE, the closed loop NE, and the closed loop in feedback form NE (a.k.a., the Markovian NE).
Throughout the paper, we will consider the Markovian NE. Markovian NE means that the controls
are deterministic functions of time t, current state xt, and a fixed measure µt. More precisely,
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Definition 1 (Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium to (N-FV)). A Markovian control (ξi∗+· , ξi∗−· ) ∈ UN
for i = 1, . . . , N is a Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium to (N-FV) if for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, any
(s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and any Markovian (ξi′+· , ξi
′−· ) ∈ UN ,
ExNs−
[
J i,N (s, xNs−, ξ
i′+
· , ξ
i′−
· ; ξ
∗−i
· )
]
≥ ExNs−
[
J i,N (s, xNs−, ξ
i∗+
· , ξ
i∗−
· ; ξ
∗−i
· )
]− ǫ.
Definition 2 (Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium to (N-BD)). A Markovian control (ξi∗+· , ξi∗−· ) ∈ UNθ
for i = 1, . . . , N is a Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium to (N-BD) if for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, any
(s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and any Markovian (ξi′+· , ξi
′−· ) ∈ UNθ ,
ExN
s−,θ
[
J
i,N
θ (s, x
N
s−,θ, ξ
i′+
· , ξ
i′−
· ; ξ
∗−i
· )
]
≥ ExN
s−,θ
[
J
i,N
θ (s, x
N
s−,θ, ξ
i∗+
· , ξ
i∗−
· ; ξ
∗−i
· )
]
− ǫ.
We will show that both N -player games, game (N-BD) and game (N-FV), can be approximated
by MFGs with singular controls of bounded velocity, as introduced below.
MFGs with singular controls of bounded velocity. Assume that all N players are identical.
That is, for each time t ∈ [0, T ], all xit have the same probability distribution. Define µt =
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxit
as a limit of the empirical distributions of xit. Then, according to SLLN, as N →∞,
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(xt, x
j
t )→
∫
R
b0(xt, y)µt(dy) = b(xt, µt),
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(xt, x
j
t )→
∫
R
f0(xt, y)µt(dy) = f(xt, µt),
subject to appropriate technical conditions. Here b, f : R × P1(R) → R are functions satisfying
assumptions to be specified later. That is, instead of game (N-BD), one can solve for a pair of
control {ξ∗t }t∈[0,T ] and mean information {µ∗t }t∈[0,T ] such that
1. Under {µ∗t}t∈[0,T ], {ξ∗t }t∈[0,T ] = {(ξ∗,+t , ξ∗−t )}t∈[0,T ] is an optimal strategy for
vθ(s, x|{µ∗t }) := inf
(ξ+· ,ξ
−
· )∈Uθ
Jθ(s, x, ξ
+
· , ξ
−
· |{µ∗t })
:= inf
(ξ+· ,ξ
−
· )∈Uθ
Eµ∗s
[∫ T
s
(
f(xt, µt) + γ1ξ˙
+
t + γ2ξ˙
−
t
)
dt|xs = x
]
,
(MFG-BD)
subject to
dxt =
(
b(xt, µ
∗
t ) + ξ˙
+
t − ξ˙−t
)
dt+ σdWt, x
∗
s ∼ µ∗s, (4)
Uθ =
{
(ξ+· , ξ
−
· )
∣∣∣∣ξ+t and ξ−t are F (xt−)t -adapted, ca´dla´g, nondecreasing, ξ+s = ξ−s = 0,
0 ≤ ξ˙+t , ξ˙−t ≤ θ,E
[∫ T
s
dξ+t
]
<∞, and E
[∫ T
s
dξ−t
]
<∞, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T
}
,
with {F (xt−)t }s≤t≤T the filtration of {(xt−)}s≤t≤T . When θ →∞, we simply write U instead
of U∞ for notational simplicity.
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2. µ∗t is the probability distribution of x∗t which is given by
dx∗t =
(
b(x∗t , µ
∗
t ) + ξ˙
∗+
t − ξ˙∗−t
)
dt+ σdWt, s ≤ t ≤ T, x∗s ∼ µ∗s.
Such a pair (ξ∗,+· , ξ
∗,−
· ) ∈ Uθ and {µ∗t} ∈ M[0,T ] constitute a solution of (MFG-BD).
Remark 1. Note here the game value vθ(s, x|{µ∗t }) = inf(ξ+· ,ξ−· )∈Uθ Jθ(s, x, ξ+· , ξ−· |{µ∗t }) with x∗s = x
being a sample from µ∗s. An alternative definition of the game is to solve v˜θ(s, µ∗s) with v˜θ(s, µ∗s) =
Eµ∗s [vθ(s, xs)]. This game value can be easily recovered from vθ(s, x). (See also [23] and [26, Section
2.2.2] for a similar set up.)
For ease of exposition, we will use the following notion of control function, for a fixed µt.
Definition 3 (Control function). A control of bounded velocity ξt is called Markovian if dξt =
ξ˙tdt = ϕ(t, xt|{µt})dt for some function ϕ : [0, T ]×R→ R. ϕ(t, xt|{µt}) is called the control func-
tion for the fixed {µt}. A control of a finite variation ξt is called Markovian if dξt = dϕ(t, xt|{µt})
for some function ϕ. ϕ is called the control function for the fixed {µt}.
2.2 Main results
The main results are derived based on the following assumptions.
Technical assumptions.
(A1). b0(x, y) and f0(x, y) are Lipschitz continuous in both x and y. That is, |b0(x1, y1)−b0(x2, y2)| ≤
Lip(b0)(|x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|) and |f0(x1, y1)− f0(x2, y2)| ≤ Lip(f0)(|x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|) for
some Lip(b0), Lip(f0) > 0. Moreover, |b0(x, y)| ≤ c1 for some c1. b(x, µ) and f(x, µ) are
Lipschitz continuous in x and µ, and b(x, µ) is bounded. That is, |b(x1, µ1) − b(x2, µ2)| ≤
Lip(b)(|x1−x2|+D1(µ1, µ2)) for some Lip(b) > 0, and |f(x1, µ1)− f(x2, µ2)| ≤ Lip(f)(|x1−
x2|+D1(µ1, µ2)) for some Lip(f) > 0, and |b(x, µ)| ≤ c2 for some c2.
(A2). f(x, µ) has a first-order derivative in x with f(x, µ) and ∂xf(x, µ) satisfying the polynomial
growth condition. Moreover, for any fixed µ ∈ P2(R), f(x, µ) is convex and nonlinear in
x. Moreover, there exists some constant cf satisfying |f(x, µ)| ≤ cf
(
1 + |x|2 + ∫
R
y2µ(dy)
)
for any x ∈ R, µ ∈ P2(R). Note that this assumption is well-posed: by definition of M[0,T ],
µ ∈ P2.
(A3). b(x, µ) has first- and second-order derivatives with respect to x with uniformly continuous
and bounded derivatives in x.
(A4). −γ1 < γ2. This ensures the finiteness of the value function. Indeed, take game (N-FV) with
−γ1 > γ2. Then, letting dξi+t = dξi−t =M and M →∞, we will have J i,N → −∞.
(A5). (Monotonicity of the cost function) f satisfies either
(i).
∫
R
(f(x, µ1)− f(x, µ2))(µ1 − µ2)(dx) ≥ 0, for any µ1, µ2 ∈ P2(R),
and H(x, p) = inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)p + γ1ξ˙+ + γ2ξ˙−} satisfies the following condition for any
x, p, q ∈ R
if H(x, p + q)−H(x, p)− ∂pH(x, p)q = 0, then ∂pH(x, p+ q) = ∂pH(x, p), or
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(ii).
∫
R
(f(x, µ1)− f(x, µ2))(µ1 − µ2)(dx) > 0, for any µ1 6= µ2 ∈ P2(R).
As in [28, 8], Assumption (A5) is critical to ensure the uniqueness for the solution of (MFG-BD),
as will be clear from the proof of Proposition 5 for the uniqueness of the fixed point.
(A6). (Rationality of players) For any control function ϕ, any t ∈ [0, T ], any fixed {µt}, and any
x, y ∈ R, (x− y)
(
ϕ(t, x|{µt})− ϕ(t, y|{µt})
)
≤ 0.
Intuitively, this assumption says that the better off the state of an individual player, the
less likely the player exercises controls, in order to minimize her cost. This assumption first
appeared in [18] in the analysis of BSDEs.
Main Theorem. Assume (A1)–(A6). Then,
a). For any fixed θ, the optimal control to (MFG-BD) is an ǫN -NE to (N-BD), given that the
distribution of xNs,θ at any given initial time s ∈ [0, T ] among N players are permutation
invariant. Here ǫN = O
(
1√
N
)
;
b). The optimal control to (MFG-BD) is an (ǫN + ǫθ)-NE to (N-FV), given that the distribution
of xNs at any given initial time s ∈ [0, T ] among N players are permutation invariant. Here
ǫN = O
(
1√
N
)
, and ǫθ → 0 as θ →∞.
3 Derivation of the main Theorem
The relationship between the stochastic games (N-FV), (N-BD), and (MFG-BD) is built in three
steps. The first step concerns the analysis of the associated stochastic control problem for (MFG-BD).
3.1 Control problems
To start, we introduce the underlying stochastic control problems.
Control problem of a bounded velocity. Let {µt} ∈ M[0,T ] be a fixed exogenous flow of
probability measures, and consider the following control problem,
vθ(s, x|{µt}) , inf
(ξ+· ,ξ
−
· )∈Uθ
Jθ(s, x, ξ
+
· , ξ
−
· |{µt})
= inf
(ξ+· ,ξ
−
· )∈Uθ
E
[∫ T
s
(
f(xt, µt) + γ1ξ˙
+
t + γ2ξ˙
−
t
)
dt
]
,
(Control-BD)
subject to dxt = b(xt, µt)dt+ σdWt, xs = x.
If controls are of finite variation, that is, θ =∞, then we have
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Control problem of finite variation.
v(s, x|{µt}) , inf
(ξ+· ,ξ
−
· )∈U
E
[∫ T
s
f(xt, µt)dt+ γ1dξ
+
t + γ2dξ
−
t
]
, (Control-FV)
subject to
dxt = b(xt, µt)dt+ σdWt + dξ
+
t − dξ−t , xs− = x.
Note that problem (Control-BD) is a classical stochastic control problem. The associated HJB
equation with the terminal condition is given by
−∂tvθ = inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(
b(x, µ) + (ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)
)
∂xvθ +
(
f(x, µ) + γ1ξ˙
+ + γ2ξ˙
−
)}
+
σ2
2
∂xxvθ
= min
{
(∂xvθ + γ1)θ, (−∂xvθ + γ2)θ, 0
}
+b(x, µ)∂xvθ + f(x, µ) +
σ2
2
∂xxvθ.
with vθ(T, x|{µt}) = 0, ∀x ∈ R.
(5)
Proposition 1. Assume (A1)–(A4). The HJB Eqn. (5) has a unique solution v in C1,2([0, T ]×R)
with a polynomial growth. Furthermore, this solution is the value function to problem (Control-BD),
and the corresponding optimal control function is
ϕθ(t, xt|{µt}) = ξ˙+t,θ − ξ˙−t,θ =


θ if ∂xvθ(t, xt|{µt}) ≤ −γ1,
0 if − γ1 < ∂xvθ(t, xt|{µt}) < γ2,
−θ if γ2 ≤ ∂xvθ(t, xt|{µt}).
(6)
Moreover, the optimal control function ϕθ(t, x|{µt}) is unique and so is the optimally controlled
state process xt,θ with
dxt,θ =
(
b(xt,θ, µt) + ϕθ(t, xt,θ|{µt})
)
dt+ σdWt, xs,θ = x.
Proof. By [20, Theorem 6.2, Chapter VI], the HJB Eqn. (5) has a unique solution w in C1,2([0, T ]×
R) with a polynomial growth. Standard verification argument will show that it is the value function
to problem (Control-BD). Moreover, the optimal control function is
ϕθ(t, xt|{µt}) =


θ if ∂xvθ(t, xt,θ|{µt}) ≤ −γ1,
0 if − γ1 < ∂xvθ(t, xt,θ|{µt}) < γ2,
−θ if γ2 ≤ ∂xvθ(t, xt,θ|{µt}).
Now, by Proposition 1, there exists a unique value function vθ(t, x|{µt}) to problem (Control-BD).
Furthermore, by (6), the optimal control function ϕθ(t, x|{µt}) is uniquely determined. Let us
prove that the optimally controlled state process xt,θ exists and is unique.
For any given fixed xnt,θ, consider a mapping Φ such that Φ(x
n
t,θ) = x
n+1
t,θ where x
n+1
t,θ is a solution
to the following SDE:
dxn+1t,θ =
(
b(xnt,θ, µt) + ϕθ(t, x
n+1
t,θ |{µt})
)
dt+ σdWt, x
n+1
s,θ = x. (7)
By [34], for any given xnt,θ, the SDE (7) has a unique solution x
n+1
t,θ , so the mapping Φ is well
defined. Then, for any n ∈ N,
d(xn+1t,θ − xn+2t,θ ) =
(
b(xnt,θ, µt)− b(xn+1t,θ , µt) + ϕθ(t, xn+1t,θ |{µt})− ϕθ(t, xn+2t,θ |{µt})
)
dt.
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Because ϕθ(t, x|{µt}) is nonincreasing in x,
d(xn+1t,θ − xn+2t,θ )2
= 2(xn+1t,θ − xn+2t,θ )
(
b(xnt,θ, µt)− b(xn+1t,θ , µt) + ϕθ(t, xn+1t,θ |{µt})− ϕθ(t, xn+2t,θ |{µt})
)
dt
≤ 2Lip(b)|xn+1t,θ − xn+2t,θ ||xnt,θ − xn+1t,θ |dt
≤ Lip(b)
(
|xn+1t,θ − xn+2t,θ |2 + |xnt,θ − xn+1t,θ |2
)
dt.
By Gronwall’s inequality, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
|xn+1t,θ − xn+2t,θ |2 ≤ Lip(b) exp
(
Lip(b)t
)∫ t
0
|xns,θ − xn+1s,θ |2ds.
Hence, for any n ∈ N,
|xn+1t,θ − xn+2t,θ |2 ≤
(
Lip(b)t
)n
exp
(
nLip(b)t
)
n!
|x1t,θ − x2t,θ|2.
As n → ∞, Φ is a contraction mapping, and the SDE (7) has a unique fixed point solution.
Therefore, there exists a unique optimally controlled state process xt,θ to problem (Control-BD).
Furthermore, the optimal Markovian control (ξ+·,θ, ξ
−
·,θ) to (Control-BD) also uniquely exists.
Next, we establish the regularity of the value function to problem (Control-BD).
Proposition 2. Assume (A1)–(A4). For any fixed t ∈ [0, T ], the value function vθ(t, x|{µt}) for
problem (Control-BD) is strictly convex in x.
Proof. Fix any x1, x2 ∈ R and any λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any (ξ1,+· , ξ1,−· ) ∈ Uθ and (ξ2,+· , ξ2,−· ) ∈ Uθ, by the
convexity of f ,
λJθ(s, x1, ξ
1,+
· , ξ
1,−
· |{µt}) + (1− λ)JT,θ(s, x2, ξ2,+· , ξ2,−· |{µt})
≥Jθ(s, λx1 + (1− λ)x2, λξ1,+· + (1− λ)ξ1,+· , λξ2,+· + (1− λ)ξ2,−· |{µt})
≥vθ(s, λx1 + (1− λ)x2|{µt}).
Since this holds for any (ξ1,+· , ξ
1,−
· ) ∈ Uθ and (ξ2,+· , ξ2,−· ) ∈ Uθ,
λvθ(s, x1|{µt}) + (1− λ)Jθ(s, x2, ξ2,+· , ξ2,−· |{µt}) ≥ vθ(s, λx1 + (1− λ)x2|{µt}),
λvθ(s, x1|{µt}) + (1− λ)vθ(s, x2|{µt}) ≥ vθ(s, λx1 + (1− λ)x2|{µt}).
Hence, vθ(s, x|{µt}) is convex in x. By Proposition 1, vθ(s, x|{µt}) is a C1,2([0, T ] × R) solution to
the equation
−∂tvθ = min
{
(∂xvθ + γ1)θ, (−∂xvθ + γ2)θ, 0
}
+b(x, µ)∂xvθ + f(x, µ) +
σ2
2
∂xxvθ.
Since f(x, µ) is not linear in x, the solution to this equation is also nonlinear in x. Hence,
vθ(s, x|{µt}) is strictly convex.
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With this convexity, we have
Theorem 1. Assume (A1)–(A4). Then for any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, as θ → ∞, the value func-
tion vθ(s, x|{µt}) of (Control-BD) converges to the value function v(s, x|{µt}) of (Control-FV).
Moreover, there exists an optimal control of a feedback form for (Control-FV).
Proof. Fix {µt} ∈ M[0,T ]. For any (ζ+· , ζ−· ) ∈ U , since each path of a finite variation process
is almost everywhere differentiable, there exists a sequence of bounded velocity functions which
converges to the path as θ → ∞. Hence, there exists a sequence {(ζ+·,θ, ζ−·,θ)}θ∈[0,∞) such that
(ζ+·,θ, ζ
−
·,θ) ∈ Uθ and E
∫ T
0 |ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t | → 0,E
∫ T
0 |ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t | → 0 as θ →∞.
Define ǫθ as
ǫθ = O
(
E
∫ T
0
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t |+ E
∫ T
0
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t |
)
, (8)
and ǫθ → 0 as θ →∞.
Denote
dxˆt,θ = (b(xˆt,θ, µt) + ζ˙
+
t,θ − ζ˙−t,θ)dt+ σdWt, xˆs,θ = x, and
dxˆt = b(xˆt, µt)dt+ σdWt + dζ
+
t − dζ−t , xˆs− = x.
Then, for any τ ∈ [s, T ],
|xˆτ,θ − xˆτ | ≤
∫ τ
s
|b(xˆt,θ, µt)− b(xˆt, µt)|dt+
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t |+
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t |
≤
∫ τ
s
Lip(b)|xˆt,θ − xˆt|dt+
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t |+
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t |.
By Gronwall’s inequality,
E|xˆτ,θ − xˆτ | ≤ O
(
E
∫ τ
0
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t |+ E
∫ τ
0
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t |
)
.
Consequently, ∣∣∣∣J(s, x, ζ+t , ζ−t |{µt})− Jθ(s, x, ζ+t,θ, ζ−t,θ|{µt})
∣∣∣∣
≤ E
[∣∣∣∣
∫ T
s
f(xˆt, µt)− f(xˆt,θ, µt) + γ1dζ+t + γ2dζ−t − γ1ζ˙+t,θdt− γ2ζ˙−t,θdt
∣∣∣∣
]
≤ E
[∫ T
s
Lip(f)|xˆt − xˆt,θ|+ γ1|dζ+t − ζ˙+t,θdt|+ γ2|dζ−t − ζ˙−t,θdt|
]
≤ O
(
E
∫ T
0
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t |+ E
∫ T
0
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t |
)
.
Therefore,
∣∣∣∣v(s, x|{µt})− vθ(s, x|{µt})
∣∣∣∣→ 0 as θ → 0.
Now a similar argument as in Corollary (4.11) [29] shows the existence of a feedback control for
(Control-FV).
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3.2 Game (MFG-BD)
Our next step is to analyze the game (MFG-BD). In particular, we see that
Theorem 2. Assume (A1)–(A6). Then there exists a unique solution ((ξ∗+· , ξ∗−· ), {µ∗t }) of (MFG-BD).
Moreover, the corresponding value function vθ(s, x) for (MFG-BD) is in C
1,2([0, T ]×R) with a poly-
nomial growth.
The proof of the existence of the MFG solution proceeds as follows.
First, from Proposition 1 we see that for any given fixed {µt} there exists a unique optimal
control function as ϕθ(t, x|{µt}). Now, one can define a mapping Γ1 fromM[0,T ] to a class of pairs
of the optimal control function ϕθ and the fixed flow of probability measures {µt} such that
Γ1({µt}) =
(
ϕθ(t, x|{µt}), {µt}
)
.
Moreover, by Proposition 1 the optimally controlled process xt,θ under the fixed {µt} exists uniquely
with
dxt,θ =
(
b(xt,θ, µt) + ϕθ(t, xt,θ|{µt})
)
dt+ σdWt, xs,θ = x.
Consequently, we can define Γ2 so that
Γ2
(
ϕθ(t, x|{µt}), {µt}
)
= {µ˜t},
where µ˜t is the probability measure of xt,θ for each t ∈ [0, T ].
Now, define a mapping Γ as
Γ({µt}) = Γ2 ◦ Γ1({µt}) = {µ˜t}.
We will use the Schauder fixed point theorem [32, Theorem 4.1.1] to show the existence of a fixed
point. The key is to prove that Γ is a continuous mapping of M[0,T ] into M[0,T ], and the range of
Γ is relatively compact [5].
Proposition 3. Assume (A1)–(A4). Γ is a mapping from M[0,T ] to M[0,T ].
Proof. For any {µt} in M[0,T ], let us prove that {µ˜t} = Γ({µt}) is also in M[0,T ]. Without loss of
generality, suppose s > t, and
xs = xt +
∫ s
t
(
b(xr, µr) + ϕθ(r, xr|{µt})
)
dr +
∫ s
t
σdWr.
Since b(x, µ) is bounded, |ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})| ≤ θ, and E
∣∣∣∣(b(xr, µr) + ϕθ(r, xr|{µt}))
∣∣∣∣≤ M for large M
and for any r ∈ [0, T ],
D1(µ˜s, µ˜t) ≤ E|xs − xt|
≤ E
∫ s
t
∣∣∣∣b(xr, µr) + ϕ(r, xr |{µt})
∣∣∣∣dr + σE sup
r∈[t,s]
|Wr −Wt|
≤M |s− t|+ σE sup
r∈[t,s]
|Wr −Wt| ≤M |s− t|+ σ|s− t|
1
2 .
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Therefore, sups 6=t
D1(µ˜t,µ˜s)
|t−s| 12
≤ c. For any t ∈ [0, T ], since |b(x, µ)| is bounded,
∫
R
|x|2µ˜t(dx) ≤ 2E
[∫
R
|x|2dµ˜0 + c22t2 + σ2t
]
≤ 2E
[∫
R
|x|2dµ˜0 + c21T 2 + σ2T
]
,
and sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫
R
|x|2µ˜t(dx) ≤ c.
Proposition 4. Assume (A1)–(A6). Γ :M[0,T ] →M[0,T ] is continuous.
Proof. Let {µnt } ∈ M[0,T ] for n = 1, . . . , be a sequence of flows of probability measures dM({µnt }, {µt})→
0 as n → ∞, for some {µt} ∈ M[0,T ]. Fix τ ∈ [0, T ). By Proposition 1, for each {µnt }, problem
(Control-BD) has a value function vnθ (s, x|{µnt }) with the optimal control ϕn(t, x). Let {xnt } be the
corresponding optimal controlled process:
dxnt =
(
b(xnt , µ
n
t ) + ϕ
n
θ (t, x
n
t |{µnt })
)
dt+ σdWt, τ ≤ t ≤ T, xnτ = x.
Let {µ˜nt } be a flow of probability measures of {xnt }, then Γ({µnt }) = {µ˜nt }.
Similarly, for each {µt}, problem (Control-BD) has a value function vθ(s, x|b{µt}) with the
optimal control ϕθ(t, x|{µt}). Let {xt} be the corresponding optimal controlled process:
dxt =
(
b(xt, µt) + ϕθ(t, xt|{µt})
)
dt+ σdWt, τ ≤ t ≤ T, xτ = x.
Let {µ˜t} be a flow of probability measures of {xt}, then Γ({µt}) = {µ˜t}.
To show that Γ is continuous, we need to show
dM
(
{µ˜nt }, {µ˜t}
)
→ 0 as n→∞.
This is established in four steps.
Step 1. We first establish some relation between D2({µ˜nt }, {µ˜t}) and D2({µnt }, {µt}). Note here
D1(µ˜t, µ˜
n
t ) ≤ D2(µ˜t, µ˜nt ).
For any s ∈ [τ, T ],
d(xs − xns ) =
(
b(xs, µs)− b(xns , µns ) + ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xns |{µnt })
)
ds.
Then, for any t ∈ [τ, T ],
|xt − xnt |2 = 2
∫ t
τ
(
b(xs, µs)− b(xns , µns ) + ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xns |{µnt })
)
(xs − xns )ds
≤ 2
∫ t
τ
Lip(b)
(
|xs − xns |+D1(µs, µns )
)
|xs − xns |
+
(
ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xns |{µnt })
)
(xs − xns )ds.
Lip(b)
(
|xs − xns |+D1(µs, µns )
)
|xs − xns | ≤ Lip(b0)|xs − xns |2 +
Lip(b)
2
(
(D1(µs, µ
n
s ))
2 + |xs − xns |2
)
.
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By Assumption (A6),
(ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xns |{µnt }))(xs − xns )
≤
(
ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt }) + ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt })− ϕnθ (s, xns |{µnt })
)
(xs − xns )
≤ (ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt }))(xs − xns )
≤ 1
2
(
|ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt })|2 + |xs − xns |2
)
.
Consequently,
|xt − xnt |2 ≤
∫ t
τ
(3Lip(b) + 1)|xs − xns |2 + Lip(b0)(D1(µs, µns ))2 + |ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt })|2ds.
By Gronwall’s inequality,
(D2(µ˜t, µ˜
n
t ))
2 ≤ c2
∫ t
τ
Lip(b)(D1(µs, µ
n
s ))
2 + E
[
|ϕθ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt })|2
]
ds, (9)
for some constant c2 depending on T and Lip(b).
Step 2. Now we prove that for any (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× R,
∂xv
n
θ (t, x|{µnt })→ ∂xv(t, x|{µt}) as n→∞.
By Proposition 1, vθ and v
n
θ are the solutions to the HJB Eqn. (5). For notation simplicity, let us
denote
ϕ1,θ(s, x|{µt}) = max{ϕθ(s, x|{µt}), 0}, ϕ2,θ(s, x|{µt}) = −min{ϕθ(s, x|{µt}), 0},
ϕn1,θ(s, x|{µnt }) = max{ϕnθ (s, x|{µnt }), 0}, ϕn2,θ(s, x|{µnt }) = −min{ϕnθ (s, x|{µnt }), 0}.
Since ϕ1,θ|{µt}, ϕ2,θ|{µt} are optimal controls, using Itoˆ’s formula and the HJB Eqn. (5), we obtain
− vθ(τ, x|{µt})
= vθ(T, xT |{µt})− vθ(τ, x|{µt})
= −
∫ T
τ
(
f(xs, µs) + γ1ϕ1,θ(s, xs|{µt}) + γ2ϕ2,θ(s, xs|{µt})
)
ds+
∫ T
τ
σ∂xvθ(s, xs|{µt})dWs.
(10)
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Similarly, for any n ∈ N, applying Itoˆ’s formula to vnθ (s, x) and {xt} yields
vnθ (T, xT |{µnt }) − vnθ (τ, x|{µnt })
=
∫ T
τ
∂tv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt }) + (b(xs, µs) + ϕθ(s, xs|{µt}))∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt }) +
σ2
2
∂xxv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt })ds
+
∫ T
τ
σ∂xv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt })dWs
=
∫ T
τ
∂tv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt }) + (b(xs, µns ) + ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt }))∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt }) +
σ2
2
∂xxv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt })ds
+
∫ T
τ
σ∂xv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt })dWs
−
∫ T
τ
(b(xs, µ
n
s )− b(xs, µs) + ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt })− ϕθ(s, xs|{µt}))∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt })ds
=−
∫ T
τ
(
f(xs, µ
n
s ) + γ1ϕ
n
1,θ(s, xs|{µnt }) + γ2ϕn2,θ(s, xs|{µnt })
)
ds+
∫ T
τ
σ∂xv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt })dWs
−
∫ T
τ
(b(xs, µ
n
s )− b(xs, µs) + ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt })− ϕθ(s, xs|{µt}))∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt })ds.
The last equality is due to the HJB Eqn. (5). Hence,
vnθ (τ, x|{µnt }) =
∫ T
τ
(
f(xs, µ
n
s ) + γ1ϕ
n
1,θ(s, xs|{µnt }) + γ2ϕn2,θ(s, xs|{µnt })
)
ds−
∫ T
τ
σ∂xv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt })dWs
+
∫ T
τ
(
b(xs, µ
n
s )− b(xs, µs) + ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt }) − ϕθ(s, xs|{µt}))∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt }
)
ds.
(11)
Denote H(s, x) = inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)∂xvθ(s, x|{µnt }) + γ1ξ˙+ + γ2ξ˙−}, and
Hn(s, x) = inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt }) + γ1ξ˙+ + γ2ξ˙−}. Then for any ξ˙+, ξ˙− ∈ [0, θ],
∣∣∣((ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)∂xvθ(s, x|{µt}) + γ1ξ˙+ + γ2ξ˙−)− ((ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt }) + γ1ξ˙+ + γ2ξ˙−)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ξ˙+
(
∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (x, µn|{µnt })
)
−ξ˙−
(
∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (x, µn|{µnt })
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 2θ |∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt })| .
Hence, for any s, x ∈ [τ, T ]× R,
|H(s, x)−Hn(s, x)| ≤ 2θ
∣∣∣∣∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt })
∣∣∣∣.
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By definition,
2θ
∣∣∣∣∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt })
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣
(
ϕ1,θ(t, x|{µt})− ϕ2,θ(t, x|{µt})
)
∂xvθ(s, x|{µt}) + γ1ϕ1,θ(t, x|{µt}) + γ2ϕ2,θ(t, x|{µt})
−
(
ϕn1,θ(t, x|{µnt })− ϕn2,θ(t, x|{µnt })
)
∂xv
n
θ (s, x|{µnt }) + γ1ϕn1,θ(t, x|{µnt }) + γ2ϕn2,θ(t, x|{µnt })
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
(
γ1 + ∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})
)(
ϕ1,θ(t, x|{µt})− ϕn1,θ(t, x|{µnt })
)
+
(
γ2 − ∂xvθ(s, x|{µnt })
)(
ϕ2,θ(t, x|{µt})− ϕn2,θ(t, x|{µnt })
)
+
(
∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt })
)(
ϕn1,θ(t, x|{µnt })− ϕn2,θ(t, x|{µnt })
)∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣
(
γ1 + ∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})
)(
ϕ1,θ(t, x|{µt})− ϕn1,θ(t, x|{µnt })
)
+
(
γ2 − ∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})
)(
ϕ2,θ(t, x|{µt})− ϕn2,θ(t, x|{µnt })
)∣∣∣∣− θ
∣∣∣∣∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt })
∣∣∣∣.
Hence,
3θ
∣∣∣∣∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt })
∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣
(
γ1 + ∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})
)(
ϕ1,θ(s, x|{µt})− ϕn1,θ(s, x|{µnt })
)
+
(
γ2 − ∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})
)(
ϕ2,θ(s, x|{µt})− ϕn2,θ(s, x|{µnt })
)∣∣∣∣.
(12)
Similarly,
3θ
∣∣∣∣∂xvθ(s, x|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt })
∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣
(
γ1 + ∂xv
n
θ (s, x|{µnt })
)(
ϕ1,θ(s, x|{µt})− ϕn1,θ(s, x|{µnt })
)
+
(
γ2 − ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt })
)(
ϕ2,θ(s, x|{µt})− ϕn2,θ(s, x|{µnt })
)∣∣∣∣.
(13)
Step 3. We can further show ϕnθ (s, x|{µnt })→ ϕθ(s, x|{µt}) for any s, x ∈ [0, T ]×R as n→∞.
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Indeed, from Eqns. (10) and (11) and by Itoˆ’s isometry and Cauchy–Schwartz inequality,(
vθ(τ, x|{µt})− vnθ (τ, x|{µnt })
)2
+σ2E
[∫ T
τ
(
∂xvθ(s, xs|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt })
)2
ds
]
≤3(T − τ)E
[∫ T
τ
(
f(xs, µs)− f(xs, µns )
)2
+
(
(b(xs, µs)− b(xs, µns ))∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µt})
)2
+
(
(γ1 + ∂xv
n
θ (s, x|{µnt }))(ϕ1,θ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕn1,θ(s, xs|{µnt }))
+ (γ2 − ∂xvnθ (s, x|{µnt }))(ϕ2,θ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕn2,θ(s, xs|{µnt }))
)2
ds
]
≤3(T − τ)E
[∫ T
τ
(
Lip(f)D1(µs, µ
n
s )
)2
+
(
Lip(b)D1(µs, µ
n
s )
∣∣∣∣∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt })
∣∣∣∣
)2
+
(
(γ1 + ∂xv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt }))(ϕ1,θ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕn1,θ(s, xs|{µnt }))
+ (γ2 − ∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt }))(ϕ2,θ(s, xs|{µt})− ϕn2,θ(s, xs|{µnt }))
)2
ds
]
≤3(T − τ)E
[∫ T
τ
(
Lip(f)D1(µs, µ
n
s )
)2
+
(
Lip(b)D1(µs, µ
n
s )|∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt })|
)2
+
(
3θ(∂xvθ(s, xs|{µnt })− ∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt }))
)2
ds
]
.
Let δ = σ
2
54θ2
. Then, for any τ ∈ [T − δ, T ],
(
vθ(τ, x|{µt})− vnθ (τ, x|{µnt })
)2
+
σ2
2
E
[∫ T
τ
(∂xvθ(s, xs|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt }))2ds
]
≤3(T − τ)E
[∫ T
τ
(
Lip(f)D1(µs, µ
n
s )
)2
+
(
Lip(b)D1(µs, µ
n
s )|∂xvn(s, xs|{µnt })|
)2
ds
]
.
Hence, for any τ ∈ [T − δ, T ],
vθ(τ, x|{µt})− vnθ (τ, x|{µnt })→ 0,
and
E
[∫ T
τ
(
∂xvθ(s, xs|{µt})− ∂xvnθ (s, xs|{µnt })
)2
ds
]
→ 0 as n→∞.
Since δ > 0, one can repeat this process for [T − 2δ, T − δ]. Proceeding recursively, one can
show that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, vnθ (t, x|{µnt }) → vθ(t, x|{µt}), and E
[∫ T
0
(
∂xvθ(s, xs|{µt}) −
∂xv
n
θ (s, xs|{µnt })
)2
ds
]
→ 0 as n→∞. Hence, for any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R,
∂xv
n
θ (s, x|{µnt })→ ∂xvθ(s, x|{µt}) as n→∞.
By Proposition 2, ∂xv
n
θ (s, x|{µnt }), ∂xvθ(s, x|{µt}) are strictly increasing in x, and by definition of
ϕnθ and ϕθ, ϕ
n
θ (s, x|{µnt }) converges to ϕθ(s, x|{µt}) for any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Step 4. We are now ready to show dM
(
{µ˜t}, {µ˜nt }
)
→ 0 as n→∞.
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From previous steps, ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt }) → ϕθ(s, xs|{µt}) a.s. as n → ∞, and by the Dominated
Convergence Theorem in the L2 space, for each s ∈ [0, T ], E
∣∣∣∣ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt })−ϕnθ (s, xs|{µnt })
∣∣∣∣
2
→ 0.
Hence, by inequality (9), D2(µ˜t, µ˜
n
t )→ 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ], dM
(
{µ˜t}, {µ˜nt }
)
→ 0 as n→∞. That
is, Γ is continuous.
Proposition 5. Assume (A1)–(A6). Then Γ :M[0,T ] →M[0,T ] has a fixed point, and (MFG-BD)
has a unique solution.
Proof. As in the proof in Section 3.2 and the proof of Lemma 5.7 in [8], the range of the mapping Γ
is relatively compact, and by Proposition 4, Γ is a continuous mapping. Hence, due to the Schauder
fixed point theorem [32, Theorem 4.1.1], Γ has a fixed point such that Γ({µt}) = {µt} ∈ M[0,T ].
By Assumption (A5), there exists at most one fixed point [8, 28]. Therefore, there exists a unique
fixed point solution of flow of probability measures {µ∗t}. By definition of the solution to a MFG
and Proposition 1, the optimal control is also unique.
Remark 2. Note that [27] has established for a more general MFG the Markovian NE solution.
His approach is sophisticated and consists of two main steps. The first step is the existence of a
weak solution under the convexity assumption, and the second step is to go through a measurable
selection argument to show that this weak solution is in fact the desirable one.
Our proof is to directly construct the Markov NE using the fixed point approach, based on the
special structure of game (MFG-BD). This simpler proof gives the explicit solution structure and
provides important insight for the subsequent analysis to connect MFGs and the associated N -player
games.
3.3 Proof of main Theorem
Suppose that
(
(ξ+·,θ, ξ
−
·,θ), {µt,θ}
)
is a solution to (MFG-BD) with a given bound θ, and xt,θ is the
optimally controlled process:
dxt,θ =
(
b(xt,θ, µt,θ) + ϕ1,θ(t, xt,θ|{µt,θ})− ϕ2,θ(t, xt,θ|{µt,θ})
)
dt+ σdWt, xs,θ = x,
where ξ˙+t,θ− ξ˙−t,θ = ϕθ(t, x|{µt,θ}) = ϕ1,θ(t, x|{µt,θ})−ϕ2,θ(t, x|{µt,θ}) is the optimal control function.
Note that we explicit write µt,θ here to emphasize the dependence on θ for the game (MFG-BD).
Given this {µt,θ}, let v(s, x|{µt,θ}) be the value function of the stochastic control problem
(Control-FV), and let xt be the optimal controlled process
dxt = b(xt, µt,θ)dt+ σdWt + dξ
+
t − dξ−t , xs− = x,
where the optimal control ξt is of a feedback form. Hence, denote
dϕ(t, x|{µt,θ}) = dϕ1(t, x|{µt,θ})− dϕ2(t, x|{µt,θ}) = dξ+t − dξ−t
as the optimal control function for the stochastic control problem of (Control-FV) with the fixed
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{µt,θ}. Now define
dxit,θ =
(
b(xit,θ, µt,θ) + ϕ1,θ(t, x
i
t,θ|{µt,θ})− ϕ2,θ(t, xit,θ|{µt,θ})
)
dt+ σdW it , x
i
s,θ = x,
dxit = b(x
i
t, µt,θ)dt+ dϕ1(t, x
i
t|{µt,θ})− dϕ2(t, xit|{µt,θ}) + σdW it , xis− = x,
dx
i,N
t,θ =
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ ) + ϕ1,θ(t, x
i,N
t,θ |{µt,θ})− ϕ2,θ(t, xi,Nt,θ |{µt,θ})
)
dt+ σdW it , x
i,N
s,θ = x,
Recall that (µt,θ, ϕθ) is the solution to (MFG-BD) and x
i
t,θ are i.i.d., and µt,θ is the probability
measure of xit,θ for any i = 1, . . . , N . We first establish some technical Lemmas.
Lemma 1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, E sup
s≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ
∣∣∣∣
2
= O
(
1
N
)
.
Proof.
d(xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ ) =

∫
R
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ ) + ϕθ(t, x
i
t,θ|{µt,θ})− ϕθ(t, xi,Nt,θ |{µt,θ})

 dt,
and
d(xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ )2 =
{
2(xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ )
(∫
R
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)
− 1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ ) + ϕθ(t, x
i
t,θ|{µt,θ})− ϕθ(t, xi,Nt,θ |{µt,θ})
)}
dt.
By Assumption (A6), (xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ )
(
ϕθ(t, x
i
t,θ|{µt,θ}) − ϕθ(t, xi,Nt,θ |{µt,θ})
)
≤ 0. Consequently, for
any t ∈ [s, T ],
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|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 ≤
∫ t
s
2|xiu,θ − xi,Nuθ |
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
b0(x
i
u,θ, y)µu,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
u,θ , x
j,N
u,θ )
∣∣∣∣du
≤
∫ t
s
2|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ |
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
b0(x
i
u,θ, y)µu,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
u,θ, x
j
u,θ)
∣∣∣∣du
+
∫ t
s
2|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ |
∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
u,θ, x
j
u,θ)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
u,θ, x
j,N
u,θ )
∣∣∣∣du
+
∫ t
s
2|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ |
∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
u,θ, x
j,N
u,θ )−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
u,θ , x
j,N
u,θ )
∣∣∣∣du
≤
∫ t
s
2|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ |
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
b0(x
i
u,θ, y)µu,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
u,θ, x
j
u,θ)
∣∣∣∣du
+
∫ t
s
2Lip(b0)|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ |2du+
∫ t
s
Lip(b0)
N
N∑
j=1
2|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ ||xju,θ − xj,Nt,θ |du
≤
∫ t
s
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
b0(x
i
u,θ, y)µu,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
u,θ, x
j
u,θ)
∣∣∣∣
2
du
+
∫ t
s
[1 + 3Lip(b0)]|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ |2du+
∫ t
s
Lip(b0)
N
N∑
j=1
|xju,θ − xj,Nu,θ |2du.
By the assumption that the initial distribution among N players is permutation invariant,
E|xit,θ − xit,θ|2 ≤[1 + 4Lip(b0)]E
∫ t
s
|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ |2du
+ E
∫ t
s
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
b0(x
i
u,θ, y)µu,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
u,θ, x
j
u,θ)
∣∣∣∣
2
du,
and xi·,θ’s are now i.i.d.. Due to the boundedness of b0,
E
∣∣∣∣
∫
R
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
t,θ, x
j
t,θ)
∣∣∣∣
2
= ǫ2N = O
(
1
N
)
.
Consequently,
E|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 ≤ E
∫ t
s
(1 + 4Lip(b0))|xiu,θ − xi,Nu,θ |2du+ ǫ2Ndu.
By Gronwall’s inequality,
E|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 ≤
∫ t
s
ǫ2Ndu · E
[
exp(
∫ t
s
[1 + 4Lip(b0)]du)
]
≤ ǫ2N · T · exp {T [1 + 4Lip(b0)]} ,
and hence,
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 ≤ ǫ2N · T · exp {T [1 + 4Lip(b0)]} = O
(
1
N
)
.
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Therefore, E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 = O
(
1
N
)
.
Suppose that the first player chooses a different control ξ′t which is of a bounded velocity and
all other players i = 2, 3, . . . , N choose to stay with the optimal control {ξt,θ}. Denote
dξ′t = ξ˙
′
tdt = ϕ
′(t, x)dt, and dξt,θ = ξ˙t,θdt = ϕθ(t, x|{µt,θ})dt.
Then the corresponding dynamics for the MFG is
dx˜1t,θ =
(
b(x˜1t,θ, µt,θ) + ϕ
′(t, x˜1t,θ)
)
dt+ σdW 1t
The corresponding dynamics for N -player game are
dx˜
1,N
t,θ =

 1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x˜
1,N
t,θ , x˜
j,N
t,θ ) + ϕ
′(t, x˜1,Nt,θ )

 dt+ σdW 1t ,
dx˜
i,N
t,θ =

 1
N
N∑
j=1
b(x˜i,Nt,θ , x˜
j,N
t,θ ) + ϕθ(t, x˜
i,N
t,θ |{µt,θ})

 dt+ σdW it , 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
We first show
Lemma 2. sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ | ≤ O
(
1√
N
)
.
Proof. For any 2 ≤ i ≤ N ,
d(xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ ) =

 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )− b0(x˜i,Nt,θ , x˜j,Nt,θ )
)
+ ϕθ(t, x
i,N
t,θ |{µt,θ})− ϕθ(t, x˜i,Nt,θ |{µt,θ})

 dt.
Because ϕθ(t, x|{µt,θ}) is nonincreasing in x,
|xi,NT,θ − x˜i,NT,θ |2 ≤
∫ T
s
2(xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ )

 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )− b0(x˜i,Nt,θ , x˜j,Nt,θ )
) dt
≤
∫ T
s
2(xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ )
1
N
N∑
j=1
Lip(b0)
(
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |+ |xj,Nt,θ − x˜j,Nt,θ |
)
dt
≤ 2Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 + |xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |
1
N
N∑
j=1
|xj,Nt,θ − x˜j,Nt,θ |dt
≤ 2Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 +
1
2N
N∑
j=1
(
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 + |xj,Nt,θ − x˜j,Nt,θ |2
)
dt
≤ Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
3|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 +
1
N
N∑
j=1
|xj,Nt,θ − x˜j,Nt,θ |2dt,
20
and
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2
≤ Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
[ sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t′≤t
3|xi,Nt′,θ − x˜i,Nt′,θ |2
+
N − 1
N
sup
2≤j≤N
E sup
s≤t′≤t
|xj,Nt′,θ − x˜j,Nt′,θ |2 +
1
N
E|x1,Nt,θ − x˜1,Nt,θ |2]dt
= Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
[
4N − 1
N
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t′≤t
|xi,Nt′,θ − x˜i,Nt′,θ |2 +
1
N
E|x1,Nt,θ − x˜1,Nt,θ |2
]
dt.
By Gronwall’s inequality,
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 ≤ Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
1
N
E|x1,Nt,θ − x˜1,Nt,θ |2dt · e
∫ T
0
Lip(b0)
4N−1
N
dt = O
(
1
N
)
.
So, sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Proof of main Theorem a). By Lemma 1, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ N , sup
s≤t≤T
E|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
,
and by the triangle inequality, sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ | = O( 1√N ). Therefore,
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |+ sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Finally, define
dx¯
1,N
t,θ =

 1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x¯
1,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ) + ϕ
′(t, x¯1,Nt,θ )

 dt+ σdW 1t ,
Since (x− y)(ϕ′(t, x)−ϕ′(t, y)) ≤ 0 by Assumption (A6), then a similar proof as that for Lemma 1
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shows E sup
0≤t≤T
|x˜1,Nt,θ − x¯1,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
and E sup
0≤t≤T
|x¯1,Nt,θ − x˜1t,θ| = O
(
1√
N
)
. Therefore,
ExN
s−,θ
[
J
1,N
θ (s, x
N
s−,θ, ξ
′+
· , ξ
′−
· ; ξ
−1
·,θ |{µt,θ})
]
= E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x˜
1,N
t,θ , x˜
j,N
t,θ ) + γ1ϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t,θ ) + γ2ϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t,θ )dt


≥ E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x˜
1,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ) + γ1ϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t,θ ) + γ2ϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t,θ )dt

−O( 1√
N
)
≥ E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x¯
1,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ) + γ1ϕ
′
1(t, x¯
1,N
t,θ ) + γ2ϕ
′
2(t, x¯
1,N
t,θ )dt

−O( 1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
R
f0(x˜
1
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy) + γ1ϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1
t,θ) + γ2ϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1
t,θ)dt
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
R
f0(x
1
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy) + γ1ϕ1,θ(t, x
1
t,θ|{µt,θ}) + γ2ϕ2,θ(t, x1t,θ|{µt,θ})dt
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
= E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x
1,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ ) + γ1ϕ1,θ(t, x
1,N
t,θ |{µt,θ}) + γ2ϕ2,θ(t, x1,Nt,θ |{µt,θ})dt

 −O( 1√
N
)
= ExN
s−,θ
[
J
i,N
θ (s, x
N
s−,θ, ξ
+
·,θ, ξ
−
·,θ; ξ
−1
·,θ |{µt,θ})
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
,
where the last inequality is due to the optimality of ϕ for problem (MFG-BD), and the last equality
follows a similar proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof of main Theorem b). Let all players except player 1 choose the optimal controls
(ξ+·,θ, ξ
−
·,θ), let player one choose any other controls (ξ
′+· , ξ
′−· ) ∈ U . Denote
dξ′t = dϕ
′(t, x) = dϕ′1(t, x) − dϕ′2(t, x),
dx˜1t = b(x˜
1
t , µt,θ)dt+ dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1
t )− dϕ′2(t, x˜1t ) + σdW 1t x˜1s− = x,
dx˜
1,N
t =
1
N
∑
j=1,...,N
b0(x˜
1,N
t , x˜
j,N
t, )dt+ dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t )− dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt ) + σdW 1t , x˜1,Ns− = x,
dx˜
i,N
t =
(
1
N
∑
j=1,...,N
b0(x˜
i,N
t , x˜
j,N
t ) + ϕ1,θ(t, x˜
i,N
t |{µt,θ})− ϕ2,θ(t, x˜i,Nt |{µt,θ})
)
dt+ σdW it , x
i,N
s− = x,
for i = 2, . . . , N.
Then,
d(xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt ) =

 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )− b0(x˜i,Nt , x˜j,Nt )
)
+ ϕθ(t, x
i,N
t,θ |{µt,θ})− ϕθ(t, x˜i,Nt |{µt,θ})

 dt.
By definition, ϕθ(t, x|{µt,θ}) is nonincreasing in x. Hence, a similar proof to the one for Lemma 2
yields
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sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt | = O
(
1√
N
)
(14)
From Lemma 1 and the triangle inequality, sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − x˜i,Nt | = O
(
1√
N
)
. Therefore,
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − x˜i,Nt |+ sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Since dϕ′(t, x) is also nonincreasing in x, then again the same proof as that for Lemma 1 shows
E sup
s≤t≤T
|x˜1,Nt − x˜1t | = O
(
1√
N
)
.
By the Lipschitz continuity of f, f0,
ExNs−
[
J1,N (s, xNs−, ξ
′+
· , ξ
′−
· ; ξ
−1
·,θ |{µt,θ})
]
= E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x˜
1,N
t , x˜
j,N
t )dt+ γ1dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t ) + γ2dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t )


≥ E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x˜
1,N
t , x
j
t,θ)dt+ γ1dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t ) + γ2dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t )

−O( 1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
R
f(x˜1,Nt , y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ γ1dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t ) + γ2dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t )
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
R
f(x˜1t , y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ γ1dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t ) + γ2dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t )
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
.
By definitions of x˜1t and x˜
1,N
t ,
E
∣∣∣dϕ′1(t, x˜1,Nt )− dϕ′1(t, x˜1t )− dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt ) + dϕ′2(t, x˜1t )∣∣∣
≤ Ed|x˜1,Nt − x˜1t |+ E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
∑
j=1,...,N
b0(x˜
1,N
t , x˜
j,N
t )− b(x˜1t , µt,θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dt = O
(
1√
N
)
,
(15)
and by definition of ϕ′1, ϕ
′
2,∣∣∣(dϕ′1(t, x˜1,Nt )− dϕ′1(t, x˜1t ))+ (−dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt ) + dϕ′2(t, x˜1t ))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣dϕ′1(t, x˜1,Nt )− dϕ′1(t, x˜1t )∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣−dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt ) + dϕ′2(t, x˜1t )∣∣∣ .
Therefore,
E sup
s≤t≤T
∣∣∣dϕ′1(t, x˜1,Nt )− dϕ′1(t, x˜1t )∣∣∣ = O
(
1√
N
)
,
E sup
s≤t≤T
∣∣∣−dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt ) + dϕ′2(t, x˜1t )∣∣∣ = O
(
1√
N
)
,
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and
E
[∫ T
s
∫
R
f(x˜1t , y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ γ1dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t ) + γ2dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t )
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
R
f(x˜1t , y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ γ1dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1
t ) + γ2dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1
t )
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
R
f(x1t , y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ γ1dϕ1(t, x
1
t |{µt,θ}) + γ2dϕ2(t, x1t |{µt,θ})
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
= v(s, x|{µt,θ})−O
(
1√
N
)
.
The last inequality is due to the optimality of ϕ.
Now, by Theorem 1, ∣∣∣∣vθ(s, x|{µt,θ})− v(s, x|{µt,θ})
∣∣∣∣≤ ǫθ.
Hence, by E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ | = ǫN and by the analysis as in the previous steps
ExNs−
[
J1,N (s, xNs−, ξ
′+
· , ξ
′−
· ; ξ
−1
·,θ |{µt,θ})
]
= ExNs−
[v(s, xNs−|{µt,θ})]− ǫN
≥ ExNs− [vθ(s, x
N
s−|{µt,θ})] − (ǫN + ǫθ)
= E
[∫ T
s
∫
R
f(x1t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ γ1dϕ1,θ(t, x
1
t,θ|{µt,θ}) + γ2dϕ2,θ(t, x1t,θ|{µt,θ})
]
− (ǫN + ǫθ)
≥ E

∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x
1,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )dt+ γ1dϕ1,θ(t, x
1,N
t,θ |{µt,θ}) + γ2dϕ2,θ(t, x1,Nt,θ |{µt,θ})

− (ǫN + ǫθ)
= ExNs−
[
J1,N (s, xNs−, ξ
+
·,θ, ξ
−
·,θ; ξ
−1
·,θ |{µt,θ})
]
− (ǫN + ǫθ). 
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